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Structure of presentation 
1) Taxation, state-building & accountability in theory 
2) Fiscal decentralisation in Rwanda 
3) Kigali local revenues in comparative perspective 
4) Detailed breakdown of local revenues 
5) Performance of the three decentralised taxes 
6) Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges 
 
 
Taxation, state-building and accountability :  
a virtuous circle? 
• Taxation is considered central to building state capacity in 
both theory and historical experience 
 
• Two-way relationship between taxation and accountability  
 
• Importance of ‘fiscal social contract’ (Moore) 
 
• ‘Quasi-voluntary compliance’ (Levi): effective taxation 
depends on government legitimacy & credibility as well as 
state capacity 
  
 
Taxation can fulfil multiple functions  
• Building bureaucratic capacity  
• Building accountability  
• Increasing citizen engagement with public affairs 
• Stabilising the economy  
• Incentivising /discouraging particular types of investment 
• Regulating economic activity  
• Redistributing wealth 
• Discouraging dangerous/undesirable activity 
• Decreasing dependence on aid/increasing autonomy 
 
• Even if the intention of a tax relates to just one of these, 
it may affect some of  the others as well 
Which taxes are suitable for decentralisation? 
• Effective decentralisation of service delivery requires fiscal 
decentralisation, not just dependence on transfers 
 
• Taxes relating to stabilisation functions (e.g. tariffs & VAT) 
are not suitable for local authorities; they are too cyclical 
 
• Most taxes relating to distribution are not considered 
suitable:  can exacerbate regional inequalities if wealth 
moves to areas with lower taxes 
 
• But distributive taxes relating to immobile assets (land & 
property) are considered highly suitable for decentralisation 
 
• So are business licenses and user fees for services  
Fiscal decentralisation in Rwanda  
• 3 taxes were decentralised by Law No. 17/2002 (along with 
various fees). What are the characteristics of these 3 taxes? 
 
• Property Tax: in theory is non-distortional , efficient & 
progressive; but also difficult to administer 
 
• Rental Income Tax: linked to immobile assets (property) & 
potentially very lucrative, but difficult to capture; not 
often decentralised  
 
• Business Licences: relatively straightforward to collect; 
tends to also have a regulatory function, which can 
sometimes conflict with its revenue-raising objectives 
 
• District authorities in urban areas offer particular potential  
for raising these taxes, and need to maximise them due to 
especially large service delivery mandates  
Rwanda: local taxation in national perspective 
• RRA has been very successful: highly motivated and 
competent; enjoys strong government support 
 
• RRA success reflects its high levels of bureaucratic 
capacity, but also government legitimacy, motivation & 
credibility 
 
 
• How does local taxation relate to this national picture?  
 
• RRA is model revenue authority for Africa, and Kigali has 
been called a ‘model city’. Could Kigali  also provide a 
model in terms of effective local revenue collection? 
 
Kigali: local revenues in comparative perspective 
• Kigali collects more local taxes per capita ($14) than 
Kampala ($11), & local revenues have grown more steadily 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Local revenues remain under 50% but grew in all 3 districts  
Kigali: local revenues in comparative perspective 
Local revenues and transfers, Kigali’s three districts combined 
 
• a) Absolute figures (RWF)   b) As a percentage of total  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local taxes grew as % of total city revenues, while in 
Kampala transfers have grown much faster than local taxes  
Breakdown of Kigali districts’ local revenues 
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Breakdown of Kigali districts’ local revenues 
• Much revenue in Kigali’s districts comes from  various 
frees, rent on plots, and sale of district assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gasabo District total local revenues, 2006-8 
Breakdown of Kigali districts’ local revenues 
• Nyarugenge District local revenue composition, 2007-2009 
Performance of the 3 decentralised taxes 
1) Trading licenses 
• These have performed best & most consistently: 85-95% of 
businesses are registered and pay this tax 
• Already almost ‘saturated’, so potential increase is limited 
• Issue of size differentiation within categories of business 
 
 
2) Rental income tax  
• Has been increasing fast in all districts (both in terms of 
registered taxpayers and absolute sums collected) 
• Report was inconclusive regarding whether districts or RRA 
were more effective in collecting this tax 
• Potential to increase even more due to large rental market 
• May be difficult to distinguish rental from other income 
Performance of the 3 decentralised taxes 
3) Property tax 
• Remains the most limited: amounts to around 12% of the 
three decentralised taxes, and 3% of all local revenue 
• Very small increases each year and sometimes decreases 
• Only around 1000 people registered in whole city  
• Holds great potential: PT amounts to 20-30 % of revenue in 
many African countries, and more in many other regions 
 
 
• Lack of capacity for market-based valuation 
 
• Valuation is expensive ; has to be balanced against benefits 
 
• Given the scale and pace of Kigali property boom, the 
more time that passes, the harder it will be  
 
 
  
High dependence on non-fiscal revenues: 
does it matter? 
• Around 70-80% of local revenues in Kigali are from 
sources other than taxes (i.e. non-fiscal) 
 
• Potential reasons why this may be problematic 
• Sustainability of certain sources over time  
• Fluctuations in certain sources may make them unreliable 
• Possible implications for accountability and state-building 
 
• The only way to raise ratio of taxes to other revenues 
may be through RIT and PT 
 
• User fees? 
 
• To what extent should local taxes be tied to development 
vs recurrent expenditure? 
 
Strengths & weaknesses of existing system 
• Local revenues already high compared with some 
countries  
 
• Impressive on business licensing, formalising the economy 
 
• National government is supportive of local authorities  
 
• District revenue systems are becoming streamlined at KCC 
 
 
• Dependence on transfers still quite high (which may 
impede local state-building and accountability) 
 
• Some revenue sources may lack sustainability over time 
 
• The most progressive local taxes have a relatively small 
share 
 
 
Opportunities and challenges 
• PT and RIT are closely linked & can be improved in concert 
 
• New titling system should increase property tax revenues 
 
• The fact that local revenues are increasing overall may 
facilitate greater accountability/civic engagement 
 
 
• Trading licenses may have limits as a local revenue source 
 
• Low/non-market based PT may encourage speculation on 
property at the expense of other forms of investment 
 
• Districts’ capture of rental income tax remains uncertain 
 
• Potential confusion over relationship between property 
tax & land tax (rent on plots) under new titling system 
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